Israel spy agency lists failures in preventing Oct. 7 attack : NPR

TEL AVIV, Israel — Hamas code-named it The Promise of Judgement Day. As early as 2018, Israel caught wind of Hamas’ battle plan to invade Israel from neighboring Gaza. However Israel’s home intelligence company didn’t take into account it a practical risk.

That’s the primary conclusion of an investigation by Israel’s Shin Bet agency into the colossal safety failure of the Hamas-led assault on Oct. 7, 2023. It was the only deadliest day in Israeli historical past, when hundreds of Palestinian attackers killed practically 1,200 individuals and took 251 individuals hostage.

That is the primary inquiry by Israel’s primary company tasked with spying on Hamas into why Israel didn’t detect and forestall the assault, following another inquiry by Israel’s military. The Shin Guess hinted at failures by Israel’s political management to hold out the company’s need to assassinate senior Hamas leaders, and blamed Israeli insurance policies of propping up Hamas rule in Gaza to purchase calm on its border.

The report sparked a retort from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has deflected private duty within the safety failure.

“On the evening of the assault, the Shin Guess chief didn’t see match to wake the Prime Minister — a elementary and apparent resolution that ought to have been made with out query,” mentioned a press release from Netanyahu’s workplace.

What went incorrect? A abstract of Israel’s findings

In an uncommon transfer for the group, the Shin Guess spy company published details of its investigation Tuesday. Here’s a listing of its primary findings:

• Israel maintained a coverage of calm with Hamas, which allowed for the group’s “huge buildup.” Israel allowed Qatar to switch tens of millions of {dollars} to Hamas to fund its governing forms in Gaza. The cash was diverted to Hamas’ navy capabilities.
• Israel falsely thought Hamas was making an attempt to inflame tensions within the Israeli-occupied West Financial institution, moderately than maneuvering to invade Israel from Gaza. Israel had concluded that any main assault could be a multi-front assault from militias all through the area, not simply from Gaza.

• Israel thought its border barrier with Gaza, a system of fences and partitions, was extra fortified than it really was.

• Israel had a poor community of spies in Gaza, following a botched intelligence operation in Gaza that Hamas uncovered in 2018. Gaza is a closed-off territory, making it tough for Israel to recruit sources there.

• Hamas’s resolution to assault when it did was attributable to a confluence of three components: Israeli practices concerning non secular Jewish ultranationalist actions on the Al Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem, which can also be revered in Judaism; Israel’s remedy of Palestinian prisoners, which had hardened underneath Israel’s far-right authorities; and the notion that Israel’s social cohesion was weakened, which was at a time of home Israeli road protests over Netanyahu’s weakening of the nation’s judiciary.

A timeline of intelligence failures earlier than the assault

• Israel had obtained intelligence of Hamas’ battle plans in two iterations, as soon as in 2018 and one other in 2022, however the company didn’t translate it into an actionable risk. A collection of indicators within the months main as much as the Oct. 7, 2023 assault was dismissed.

• At 1:00 a.m., hours earlier than the assault, the intelligence company reported Hamas was conducting emergency preparedness — but in addition noticed indicators of restraint, and assessed that Hamas was not inquisitive about an escalation at the moment.

• At 3:03 a.m., the Shin Guess alerted the nation’s safety branches, together with the Prime Minister’s Nationwide Safety Council, that a number of Hamas brigades had been activating their networks of cellphones. In a message, the company mentioned that together with extra indicators, “it may level to Hamas offensive exercise.” Forty-five SIM playing cards had been progressively activated from the night of Oct. 5 till two hours earlier than the Oct. 7 assault, however brokers dismissed it as a result of an analogous variety of SIM playing cards had been activated throughout the identical interval one 12 months earlier than.

• At 4:30 a.m., the Shin Guess chief briefed deputies concerning the worrying indicators, and a staff of forces was despatched to Israel’s south to arrange for a potential infiltration, but it surely was not enough to thwart the large-scale assault.

“The Shin Guess didn’t stop the bloodbath of October 7,” mentioned Ronen Bar, the chief of the intelligence company, within the revealed abstract of the findings. “Because the one who led the group, I’ll carry this heavy burden on my shoulders for my whole life.”

Netanyahu says a state fee of inquiry into the assault could be biased

Whereas the Shin Guess and the navy have carried out their very own investigations and submitted detailed experiences on the operational failures that led to the Oct. 7, 2023 assault, Netanyahu refuses to permit a state fee of inquiry to look at the failures of Israel’s management that contributed to the assault.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, proven right here on the U.S. Capitol final month, instructed Israel’s parliament on Tuesday that he helps the institution of an “goal” fee of inquiry into the 2023 assault, “not a fee of inquiry whose conclusions are already written prematurely.”

Oliver Contreras/AFP through Getty Photographs

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Oliver Contreras/AFP through Getty Photographs

Netanyahu served as Israel’s prime minister for 13 of the 15 years previous the outbreak of the conflict — main Israel’s years-long coverage of containing Hamas in Gaza.

In a speech to Israel’s parliament on Tuesday, Netanyahu mentioned he helps the institution of an “goal” fee of inquiry into the assault, “not a fee of inquiry whose conclusions are already written prematurely.” Netanyahu railed in opposition to “deep state bureaucrats” within the speech. In Israel, members of state commissions of inquiry are often appointed by the Supreme Court docket’s chief justice.

Public opinion polls in latest months present a majority of Israelis assist the institution of a state fee of inquiry. This aligns with previous precedents following main safety failures in Israel, such because the 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict, when a extreme intelligence failure led to a conflict with Egypt and Syria.

Opposition figures in Israel say Netanyahu seeks to make use of the Shin Guess and navy investigations to shift blame for the 2023 assaults onto them — absolving himself of duty and remaining in workplace. They warn Netanyahu may change Israel’s safety chiefs with loyalists.

“The best catastrophe that has occurred to the Jewish individuals because the Holocaust belongs to you. It is going to at all times belong to you,” mentioned opposition chief Yair Lapid in a speech in parliament, addressing Netanyahu. “A whole nation is in ache, anxious, offended, deserted by a authorities that takes no duty for something. Express regret from them.”

Yanal Jabarin contributed to this story from Jerusalem and Itay Stern from Tel Aviv.